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This Capstone memorandum explores the potential for a significant increase in the loss 
of analytic expertise in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA’s Directorate of 
Analysis (DA) prides itself on developing analysts who can craft products on all pertinent 
global issues to better inform the President and U.S. policymakers with timely, accurate, 
and objective analysis. Looking at nearly 40 years of the DA’s history, this Capstone 
investigates the internal and external factors that led to previous increases in attrition 
rates to find solutions to retain talent today. This Capstone proposes to follow the 
example of organizations with well-known leadership development cultures and 
numerous study recommendations to create a mandatory training program for first-line 
supervisors to enable the Directorate to retain its top talent and maintain its qualitative 
edge. 
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TO  DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR ANALYSIS  
FROM  DONALD K. GORDON, JR.  
SUBJECT RETAINING EXPERTISE IN THE DIRECTORATE OF ANALYSIS 
DATE  23 APRIL 2017 
 
 
Action-Forcing Event  
On 3 January 2017, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Michael Pompeo prior to 
his confirmation wrote to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the CIA’s “most 
important resource to conduct its mission is the Agency’s workforce, and it must continue to 
attract, develop, and retain a workforce that is prepared to take on the challenges we face.”1 
The week after this statement, former Deputy Director of the CIA Michael Morell, Ambassador 
and former State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin, and Southern 
Methodist University Associate Professor and Intelligence expert Joshua Rovner separately 
warned about the imminent recruiting and attrition crisis that is likely to affect the Intelligence 
Community.234 Director Pompeo after settling into the role wants to discuss with his senior 
                                                          
1 Mike Pompeo, “Letter to U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Richard Burr and Vice Chairman 
Mark Warner,” January 3, 2017, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pre-hearing-
011217.pdf and “Letter to U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Senators Ron Wyden and Martine 
Heinrich,” January 3, 2017, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pre-hearing-b-
011217.pdf.  
2 Michael J. Morell, “Trump’s Dangerous Anti-C.I.A. Crusade,” The New York Times, January 6, 2017. 
3 Daniel Benjamin, “How Trump’s Attacks on U.S. Intelligence Will Come Back to Haunt Him,” POLITICO Magazine, 
January 11, 2017. 




leadership team the status of each Directorate’s talent management, any challenges, and 
options to overcome them. 
Statement of the Problem 
The Directorate of Analysis5 (DA) requires an expert, motivated workforce to remain a world 
class analytic organization that is able to evaluate “incomplete and sometimes contradictory 
information” and produce “timely, accurate, and objective all-source analysis” for the President 
and senior policymakers.6 A significant increase in the rate of attrition will create a more-junior 
and less expert analytic cadre as valuable talent leaves for the private sector. The Directorate’s 
expertise allows it to compete and stand out to policymakers who receive assessments from 
“other intelligence agencies, journalists, scholars, lobbyists, and other purveyors of 
information.”7 Between 2004 and 2008, the DA lost on average 4.8 percent of its workforce, 
according to the CIA Office of Inspector General.8 In 2009, this rate dropped and the DA lost a 
historically low 3 percent of its workforce, according to the same report.9 Six years later, in 
2015, CIA and five similar intelligence agencies10 saw this rate double to 6.1 percent, according 
                                                          
5 I will use the terms “the DA” and “the Directorate” to refer to CIA’s analytic component that was previously called 
the Directorate of Intelligence and the National Foreign Assessments Center. 
6 CIA, “Intelligence & Analysis,” https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/index.html.  
7 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes, Volume 1, Note 6: Analytic 
Expertise,” February 1997, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/tradecraft_notes/contents.htm.  
8 CIA Office of Inspector General, “(U) Report of Follow-up Inspection – Retention in the Agency,” July 2010, 3,  
https://archive.org/details/741885-cia-employee-retention-report.  
9 Ibid. 
10 The six Agencies are the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency. 
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to the best available information from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI),11 suggesting a similar increase in the attrition rate among analysts.12  
The DA is poised to face increased external challenges in its battle for talent because of 
the health of the U.S. economy, pending decreases in federal wages and benefits, and 
perceived loss of prestige and access. Since the historical low rate of attrition in 2009, the U.S. 
unemployment rate has dropped from a peak of 10 percent to 4.7 percent, according to the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, with the unemployment rate in December 2016 for the DA’s 
target population—those with college degrees—dropping to 2.5 percent.13 Further, the new 
administration and Congressional allies aim to enact legislation to change civil service 
protections to allow faster firing of federal employees and reduce federal wage and retirement 
benefits.1415 Before the inauguration, the President suggested that he would not need to be 
briefed on or read the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) every day.16 In the late 1990s, DA leadership 
shifted the Directorate to a “First Customer” mentality and emphasized the importance of its 
flagship product, the PDB. Over time, this changed the analytic culture to crafting products with 
                                                          
11 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), “(U) Annual Demographic Report: Hiring and Retention of 
Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community, Fiscal Year 2015,” 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FY%202015%20Annual%20Report.pdf, 41. 
12 In 2009, the overall Agency attrition rate was 3.5 percent compared to the DA’s 3 percent, according to the CIA 
IG Report. Therefore, a 6.1 percent attrition rate among the CIA and similar agencies suggests that the DA attrition 
rate also increased. 
13 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), “Table A-4: Employment status of the civilian population 25 years and over 
by educational attainment,” January 6, 2017, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t04.htm.  
14 Joe Davidson, “Beard: Chaffetz committee plans broad agenda affecting federal workers,” The Washington Post, 
January 10, 2017. 
15 Ibid., “New feds could be fired for ‘no cause at all’ by Trump under planned legislation,” The Washington Post, 
January 12, 2017. 
16 “Burn before reading: How America’s intelligence agencies are preparing to serve Donald Trump,” The 
Economist, January 14, 2017. 
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the President’s needs foremost in mind and in part coupling the Directorate’s morale to its 
perceived access to the President.17 
The system is blinking red. We are entering a period where the above external factors 
are coupling with a major organizational change within the Agency that mirrors similar 
circumstances in the early 1980s that preceded a spike in attrition. In the 1980s, DA attrition 
increased from an average between Fiscal Year (FY) 1979 to 1982 of 5.7 percent to 8.1 percent 
in FY 1983 to over 10 percent for the first half of FY 1984, according to a memorandum from DA 
senior leadership to the CIA Executive Director.18 Two weeks later in April 1984, the Director of 
the National Security Agency in a letter to the Director of Central Intelligence discussed the 
attrition problems his agency was experiencing and noted that if their rates rose to 10 percent 
that it would have “an impact that would seriously impede our ability to do our job.”19 The 
reasons behind these increasing attrition rates were that federal service became less attractive 
than the private sector because of the erosion of retirement and other financial benefits20 as 
the government transitioned away from a defined pension benefit. In 1981, the DA went 
through a major reorganization from mostly single discipline offices that covered political 
analysis, economic analysis, strategic research, etc. to multidisciplinary regional offices covering 
                                                          
17 David Priess, The President’s Book of Secrets (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2016), pp. 206-211. 
18 Richard J. Kerr, Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence, to Executive Director, “Projection of Manpower 
Needs, Retention, and Availability,” May 24, 1984 [retrieved from the CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document 
Number (FOIA) CIA-RDP89B00423R000200170014-1], 3, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP89B00423R000200170014-1.pdf.  
19 Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, Director of the National Security Agency, to William J. Casey, Director of 
Central Intelligence, “Personnel Issues Related to the Erosion of Benefits for the Federal Service,” April 9, 1984 
[retrieved from the CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number (FOIA) CIA-RDP86B00338R000400530019-2], 
4, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86B00338R000400530019-2.pdf. 
20 Kerr, 3-4. 
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the Soviets, Africa and Latin America, East Asia and Pacific, and so forth.21 The reorganization 
caused hundreds of analysts to have to move offices and learn to work with new colleagues.22 
Three years later this difficult transition was cited as one of the major reasons for increased 
rates of analyst attrition.23 In the past year, the DA also started going through a major 
reorganization as the Agency modernized into ten mission centers with collocated officers from 
every directorate,24 again causing hundreds of analysts to move offices and learn to work with 
new colleagues. By 1986, the attrition forced the Office of Soviet Analysis to promote sooner 
than wanted senior analysts into management positions and give more responsibility to junior 
analysts.25 It is unknown what part the attrition played on the CIA’s perceived intelligence 
failure for predicting the collapse of the Soviet Union a few years later.26 
History  
The Directorate in the 1980s started to experience rising attrition rates similar to the rest of the 
federal government. A common theme across internal CIA studies, Congressional committees, 
think tanks, Presidential Commissions, and academic research was a clear decades-long failure 
                                                          
21 John N. McMahon, Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, “Announcement of Organizational Change: 
National Foreign Assessment Center,” September 21, 1981 [retrieved from the CIA Electronic Reading Room, 
Document Number (FOIA) CIA-RDP84B00890R000400060058-7], 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00890R000400060058-7.pdf.  
22 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), The Directorate of Intelligence: Fifty Years of Informing Policy, 1952 
– 2002 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2002), 14-15. 
23 Kerr, 4. 
24 CIA Director John Brennan, “Message to the Workforce – Our Agency’s Blueprint for the Future,” March 6, 2015. 
25 Douglas J. MacEachin, Director of Soviet Analysis, to Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence, “Long Range 
Outlook,” June 18, 1986 [retrieved from the CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number (FOIA) CIA-
RDP90G01359R000300030020-2], https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP90G01359R000300030020-2.pdf.   
26 For a discussion of what CIA assessed correctly about the fall of the Soviet Union, please see: Douglas J. 





to act upon recommended solutions to improve manager—especially first-line supervisor—
training and development that would enable the federal government to better counteract 
external challenges and retain talent. In 1968, the DA chief stressed in a letter to the Director of 
Central Intelligence the importance of managers in retaining talent: “The supervisor is key to 
effective career management. He makes the decision to hire an employee, initiates action to 
move him, and recommends him for training and promotion. We believe that this key role of 
the supervisor precludes a highly-centralized career management program.”27 
 The CIA since its founding has enjoyed special authorities separate from the rest of the 
federal government to allow it to recruit and retain talent. The Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949 established that all Agency employees except for the Presidentially-appointed Director 
and Deputy Director are part of the “excepted service” as opposed to the “competitive 
service.”28 This designation allows the Agency to ignore provisions outlined in U.S. Code Title 5 
for competitive civil service positions, such as Veteran’s preference for hiring, faster removal of 
poor employees, and other unique circumstances for a secretive intelligence agency. In 1973, 
the CIA reaffirmed to the Congress its need for continued excepted service status because of its 
mission and unique personnel issues.29 However, the CIA mainly followed Title 5 rules on pay, 
leave, benefits, and other personnel items while using its authorities sparingly for instance to 
                                                          
27 R. J. Smith, Deputy Director for Intelligence, to Director of Central Intelligence, “Career Management in the 
Director of Intelligence,” July 31, 1968, [retrieved from the CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number 
(FOIA) CIA-RDP78B05703A000500030004-4], 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP78B05703A000500030004-4.pdf.  
28 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law 110, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (June 20, 1949). 




increase pay for officers serving overseas or create special pay schedules for medical 
professionals and engineers.30 
 In the 1980s, the DA experienced an accelerated pace of senior analyst departures31 
that mirrored expertise lost in the rest of the government in part because of Reagan 
administration policies that were perceived to be anti-federal worker. Charles Levine of the 
Congressional Research Service in 1986 highlighted how difficult it was for federal agencies to 
recruit and retain talent because of the low morale stemming from the perception of being part 
of organizations that were “failing” and that “more challenging, greater flexibility, and higher 
rewards [were] available in the private sector.”32 Assessments like Levine’s led to the creation 
of the National Commission on Public Service in 1987 that was presided over by former 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Paul A. Volcker to provide 
recommendations to the President and the Congress to solve the “quiet crisis” within the 
federal government. In 1989, what became known as the Volcker Commission33 released its 
findings and found that only 13 percent of interviewed senior executives would recommend 
that young people start their careers in the federal government and over half of overall survey 
respondents assessed that recruiting quality personnel had become more difficult in the past 
                                                          
30 William J. Casey, “DCI Statement for the Record to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on CIA Personnel 
Management,” July 23, 1986, [retrieved from the CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number (FOIA) CIA-
RDP90-00998R000100050030-0], 5-6, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-
00998R000100050030-0.pdf.  
31 John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Analyst/Manager Relations at the CIA,” Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 
(1995), 210. 
32 Charles Levine, “The Federal Government in the Year 2000: Administrative Legacies of the Reagan Years,” Public 
Administration Review 46, no. 3 (May/June 1986), 199-200 and 202. 
33 Paul A. Volcker and the National Commission on the Public Service, Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public 




five years.34 Further, a major cause asserted of the government’s recruiting and retention 
problems was the “years of campaign ‘bureaucrat bashing’ by candidates for elective 
office…[that] eroded the sense of pride that once came with government service. Careers that 
were once seen as proud and lively are increasingly viewed as modest and dull—even 
demeaning.”35 One of the Commission’s top recommendations was for agencies and 
departments to prioritize manager training because personnel continued to be hired for 
technical experience and then moved into management with inadequate training to transition 
into the new role.36 Then, these new poorly-equipped managers exacerbated the other causes 
that lead to greater attrition. 
 The federal government failed to implement recommended solutions to reduce attrition 
rates before the end of the Cold War in 1991 that preceded a further mandated reduction in 
personnel as part of the “peace dividend.” In 1986, a CIA Executive Development Task Force 
found the same issues that the Volcker Commission published three years later that the Agency 
was facing a period of higher attrition rates and that a major overhaul in its supervisor training 
program was needed to develop enough qualified officers to rise to the GS-15 level and senior 
ranks.37 The task force further discovered that most manager development occurred 
predominately on-the-job with formal training a “distant second.”38 The Agency attempted 
                                                          
34 Ibid., 3-4. 
35 Ibid., 12. 
36 Ibid., 42-43. 
37 Chairman, Executive Development Task Force to Executive Director, “Recommendations for Improved Executive 
Development,” July 21, 1986 [retrieved from the CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number (FOIA) CIA-
RDP90-00998R000100040004-0], 2-3, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-
00998R000100040004-0.pdf.  
38 Ibid., 4. 
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several enterprise-wide manager training schemes, but all “failed miserably” because of the 
different cultures among the operators, analysts, scientists, and support personnel.39 The 
Volcker Commission’s recommendations also unfortunately failed to take off because of a lack 
of sustained support and prioritization from the President or Congress, according to two 
academics at American University.40 Though the commission did not achieve its mandate to 
spur substantial change, it did at least temporarily succeed in changing the nature of the debate 
in slowing the “gradual erosion of respect for the public service on the part of many politicians 
and opinion leaders.”41 
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Clinton administration-mandated reductions 
in the federal workforce through attrition coupled with a strengthening economy to continue 
the trend of increasingly higher numbers of federal employees and CIA analysts departing for 
the private sector. The unemployment rate during Clinton’s presidency dropped from 7.3 to 3.9 
percent, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.42 Further, the unemployment rate for 
those with a Bachelor’s degree or higher decreased from 3.1 to 1.6 percent.43 In 1993, the 
Clinton administration’s National Performance Review led by Vice President Al Gore 
recommended a range of reforms that through greater efficiency would result in the 
elimination of 252,000 federal positions.44 Between 1993 and 1998, the non-postal service 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 Robert E. Cleary and Kimberly Nelson, “The Volcker Commission Fades Away: A Case Study in Non-
implementation,” Policy Studies Review 12: Autumn/Winter (1993), 66. 
41 Ibid., 58. 
42 BLS, “Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey,” https://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm.  
43 Ibid., “Table A-4. Employment status of the civilian population 25 years and over by educational attainment: 
Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release/tables?rid=50&eid=748&od=1993-01-01#.  
44 Vice President Al Gore and National Performance Review, From Red Tape To Results: Creating a Government 
that Works Better & Costs Less (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of the Vice President, 1993), 14. 
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portion of the federal workforce decreased by 364,989 positions or 16.9 percent overall.45 Of 
these, GS-10, 11, and 12 positions were reduced 48.9, 11.9, and 11.6 percent respectively, 
according to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM),46 reducing dramatically the pool 
from which to develop and promote managers in the 2000s. The DA was not immune to cuts 
and experienced a 17 percent reduction between 1990 and 1995 and a total reduction of 22 
percent by the end of the decade, according to remarks by the Deputy Director for Central 
Intelligence in 2001.47 Despite the greater interest in public service and hiring boom following 
9/11, the DA in 2008 totaled fewer analysts than before Clinton era reductions,48 while facing a 
more complex threat as opposed to the sole dominate one of the Cold War.49 Furthermore, the 
DA unlike other parts of the federal government does not rely on contractors to compensate 
for its reduction in staff employees because in the vast majority of cases only staff employees 
are trained and permitted to craft and brief its analysis to policymakers.50   
 The DA implemented several solutions to retain its best talent and better develop the 
personnel who remained to mitigate the effect of mandated downsizing. In the 1990s, the 
                                                          
45 Barbara L. Schwemle, “Federal Civilian Employment Reductions,” CRS Report for Congress, March 2, 1999, 2. 
46 Ibid., 14. 
47 John McLaughlin, “Remarks of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,” addressed to CIA’s conference on 
“CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991,” Princeton University, March 9-10, 2001, 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2001/ddci_speech_03092001.html.  
48 Leon E. Panetta, “Additional Prehearing Questions for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” February 9, 
2009, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/answers.pdf.  
49 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,” 
February 10, 2011, http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/dnisfr021011.pdf.  
50 For articles on the U.S. government’s expanded use of contractors since the 1990s, please see: Paul C. Light, 
“The real crisis in government,” The Washington Post, January 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/11/AR2010011103255.html; Louis Peck, “America’s $320 Billion Shadow 
Government,” The Fiscal Times, September 28, 2011, 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/09/28/Americas-320-Billion-Shadow-Government; and Jeanne 




Directorate reemphasized training and developing deeper analytic tradecraft to help analysts at 
the start of their careers and also to retain outstanding analysts through greater number of 
opportunities for intellectual enrichment.51 This focus on tradecraft resulted in the creation of 
the CIA’s Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis and the Career Analyst Program (CAP).52 
Starting in 2000, every DA analyst enrolled in the multi-month full-time program to learn the 
history of the Directorate, CIA values, analytic thinking, and delivering effective products in 
written and oral form.53 In 1986, the Director in testimony to the Senate underscored the 
problem of typical career trajectories and retaining expertise. He testified that substantive 
experts felt compelled to enter the management ranks because this was the only path to 
promotion to GS-15 and beyond. This led to problems for the officer and his subordinates since 
some of these experts were not capable of leading people.54 In 1999, the DA launched the 
Senior Analytic Service which created a career track for analysts to continue developing 
expertise and be eligible for promotion to the senior ranks without becoming a manager.55 
The new century brought in vogue the term “human capital” as a holistic measure of 
assessing the government’s ability to attract and retain talent. In 2001, the now-called U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified as “high risk” the federal government’s 
strategic human capital management system and claimed that: “It is becoming increasingly 
clear that today’s federal human capital strategies are not appropriately constituted to 
                                                          
51 CSI, 17. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Stephen Marrin, “CIA’s Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts,” International Journal of Intelligence 
and Counter Intelligence 16, no. 4 (2003), 617. 
54 Casey, 9-11. 
55 CSI, 17. 
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adequately meet current and emerging needs of government and its citizens in the most 
effective, efficient, and economical manner possible.”56 The report criticized governmentwide 
hiring freezes in the 1990s that reduced the “reservoir of future agency leaders and managers” 
from being hired and retained.57 The year prior, GAO published a self-assessment checklist to 
evaluate the effectiveness of human capital management programs.58 Senator George 
Voinovich’s subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the 
District of Columbia presented a report to the President on the “Crisis in Human Capital” and 
provided recommendations on making the federal government an employer of choice and one 
with flexibility to attract talent as today’s workforce no longer was looking for or expected a 
thirty-year career at one organization.59 In 2008, the Congressionally-chartered Project on 
National Security Reform found that human capital laws and regulations used by the national 
security establishment were wholly inadequate in attracting and retaining talent in the 21st 
century.60 
Congress in the 2000s failed to pass several benefits that were meant to help the federal 
government compete against the private sector. The first was to grant eight weeks of pay and 
benefits for leave taken for the birth or adoption of a child.61 Since 2007, the Federal Employee 
                                                          
56 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), “High-Risk Series: An Update,” GAO-01-263, January 2001, 18, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01263.pdf.  
57 Ibid., 73. 
58 Ibid., “Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders,” GAO/OCG-00-14G, September 2000, 
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/cg00014g.pdf.  
59 Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, Senate 
Committee on Government Affairs, “Report to the President: The Crisis in Human Capital,” 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 
2000, 54. 
60 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 
2008), 331. 
61 Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, “Investing in the Future of the Federal Workforce: Paid Parental Leave 
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Paid Parental Leave Act and similar bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress and 
not acted upon. In 2010, a group of Washington metropolitan area members of Congress co-
sponsored a bill specifically to address the importance of the supervisor in retaining talent and 
requiring proper training overseen by OPM.62 The Federal Supervisor Training Act of 2010 and 
similar bills were introduced and did not make it out of committee.63 
Federal agencies and departments with mixed results increased the use of tools 
provided by Congress to reverse the flow of personnel departures. The most successful 
program was the expansion of paying student loan debts in return for signing continuing service 
agreements and agreeing to stay for three years. The program grew from 16 agencies paying 
student loans for 690 employees in 2002 to 32 agencies and nearly 10,000 employees in 2015, 
according to OPM.64 The agencies universally lauded the program and said it was essential to 
their human capital needs.65 In 2006, ODNI released the Intelligence Community’s five year 
strategic human capital plan and highlighted its intent to use current statutory authorities to 
leave the General Schedule (GS) pay system and create a pay-for-performance one to better 
compete with the private sector.66 The pay banding experiment in the Defense Department 
                                                          
Improves Recruitment and Retention,” 110th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial No. 110-114 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008). 
62 Federal Daily Staff, “Lawmakers push for improved federal supervisor training,” FCW, June 23, 2010. 
63 Federal Supervisor Training Act of 2010, H. Res. 5522, 111th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-
congress/house-
bill/5522?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Federal+Supervisor+Training+Act+of+2010%22%5D%7D&r=2.  
64 OPM, “Federal Student Loan Repayment Program, Calendar Year 2015,” October 2006, and “Federal Student 
Loan Repayment Program, Fiscal Year 2002 Report to Congress,” June 2003, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/pay-leave/student-loan-repayment/#url=Repayment-Reports.  
65 Ibid., 2015. 
66 ODNI, “The US Intelligence Community’s Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan,” as an Annex to the US National 
Intelligence Strategy, June 22, 2006, 24. 
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failed and President Obama repealed its further implementation in 2009.67 Soon after repeal, 
CIA decided not to move forward with its similar pay modernization efforts.68 
The current state of talent management in the federal government is still a major work 
in progress. Despite efforts to address the issue over the past thirty years, recent attrition rates 
continue to rise. Between FY 2005 and 2007, an annual average of 14,973 employees left the 
federal government; after the recession between FY 2011 and 2016, this average increased to 
15,883, according to OPM.69 A Partnership for Public Service assessment discovered that those 
federal employees who completed under ten years of service—the future leaders of agencies—
made up the largest number of employees leaving federal government.70 The Intelligence 
Community and other specialized agencies are also not immune to these trends. In 1986, 
Charles Levine in Public Administrative Review assessed that agencies such as CIA and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) held monopolies or near monopolies on 
certain occupations which buffeted them from overall government attrition trends.71 However, 
since 2000 the rise of risk and threat intelligence companies who collect intelligence and 
perform analysis for the private sector and civilian space companies who hire engineers and 
scientists to build next generation rockets have overturned Levine’s assertion. In 2015, CIA 
embarked on a major reorganization that included the creation of a Talent Development Center 
                                                          
67 Ed O’Keefe, “Defense Authorization Bill Repeals NSPS,” The Washington Post, October 7, 2009. 
68 ODNI, “Intelligence Community Pay Modernization 2010 Mid-Year Report,” June 2010, referenced in: Thomas K. 
Coghlan, “Intelligence Community (IC) Performance Management: Did the Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) 
2007 IC Policy Directive 651 on Performance Management Achieve Its Policy Objectives,” PhD diss., George Mason 
University, July 30, 2015.  
69 OPM, “Separation from Federal Civil Service/Quit (Not Retirements),” 
https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/separations.asp.  
70 Partnership for Public Service, “Fed Figures 2014: Federal Departures,” 2014, 
https://ourpublicservice.org/publications/viewcontentdetails.php?id=352.  
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of Excellence to improve the entire Agency’s recruitment, training, and leadership 
development.72 It is too soon to evaluate the status of these reforms and their effect on 
retaining expertise within the DA.  
Background  
The primary stakeholders positioned to influence how and to what extent the Directorate 
tackles its analytic human capital issue are divided between four entities: Intelligence 
Community senior leaders, the White House, members of the Senate and House intelligence 
committees, and an influential, conservative think tank.  
 Director CIA Pompeo is the first and most important stakeholder to persuade of the 
relevance of this issue. As Director, he can decide whether the DA should tackle human capital 
specific to its needs or merge recommendations into a broader Agency-wide program to reduce 
attrition rates. The Director during the confirmation process wrote that the CIA would be more 
able to confront unforeseen challenges with additional resources. He further affirmed that the 
ability to attract, develop, and retain its workforce is one of the Agency’s most important 
missions,73 suggesting that he would be amenable to a request for additional funding to retain 
analytic talent. He also will be instrumental in requesting funds from the intelligence oversight 
committees as part of the annual intelligence budget process. The Director is well positioned 
for this role as he recently served four years as a member of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). During his tenure in Congress, the Director pursued deficit 
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reduction legislation and sought to reduce the federal workforce. During the 112th Congress, he 
cosponsored H.R. 657, the Federal Workforce Reduction Act of 2011,74 that if enacted would 
have instituted a hiring freeze for any fiscal year there was a budget deficit and a one-for-two 
replacement for separated federal employees to reduce the overall workforce. The bill 
exempted the Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security, and Veterans 
Administration, suggesting that he would favor a national security exception for CIA. 
 The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence (USD(I)) oversee the Intelligence Community and its budget. The DNI serves as the 
President’s primary intelligence advisor and controls the overall National Intelligence Program 
budget, which includes CIA funding.75 USD(I) is the top Defense Department official for 
intelligence and controls the Military Intelligence Program budget. This is an important position 
because special authorities granted to CIA are likely to be requested by USD(I) for partner 
defense components, such as the National Security Agency or Defense Intelligence Agency. The 
newly-confirmed DNI former Senator Daniel Coats (R-IN) served two stints in the U.S. Senate 
with the last few years as a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). 
From this perch, he is very familiar with the CIA and has been laudatory for Intelligence 
Community efforts since 9/11 to improve its ability to “’connect the dots’ to prevent terrorist 
attacks.”76 In 2015 and 2016, Senator Coats delivered a weekly speech on the floor of the 
Senate titled “Waste of the Week” that highlighted federal government spending that could be 
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reallocated to reduce the deficit and eventually bring down the national debt.77 During his last 
day in the Senate, he delivered his 55th Waste of the Week speech with his highlighted 
programs totaling $351 billion of wasted federal money.78 President Trump has not nominated 
someone for the USD(I) position. 
 The White House relationship with the CIA will rely in part on the access and standing of 
Director Pompeo with the President as has been customary since the Agency’s founding.79 The 
new administration ran on a campaign platform that included decreasing the size of the federal 
workforce through reducing waste, fraud, and abuse.80 Since the election, the relationship 
between the CIA and its analysis and the President is a work in progress. The White House 
transition team discarded recent DA analysis noting that it was from the same group that 
assessed that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass 
destruction.81 On the positive side, in his first official stop after the inauguration, the President 
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visited CIA headquarters, thanked the workforce, and proclaimed his strong feelings for the 
Agency and the Intelligence Community.82  
The SSCI and HPSCI oversight committees typically work in a nonpartisan manner and 
compose the annual intelligence authorization bill with input from the White House and 
Intelligence Community. The Senate and House committees both voted unanimously to 
approve the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2016.8384  The current chairpersons and ranking 
members of these committees are Chairman Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Vice Chairman 
Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Chairman Representative Devin Nunes (R-CA) and Ranking 
Member Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA). 
 The conservative think tank Heritage Foundation has emerged as a leading source for 
policy ideas for the Trump administration, according to CNN and Politico,8586 highlighting the 
importance of its assessments on the Intelligence Community and federal budget. In 2016, 
Heritage published a Backgrounder on improving analysis in the Intelligence Community.87 The 
                                                          
82 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Trump and Vice President Pence at CIA 
Headquarters,” January 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/21/remarks-president-
trump-and-vice-president-pence-cia-headquarters.  
83 Richard Burr, U.S. Senator, “Press Release: Senate Intelligence Committee Advances FY2016 Authorization Bill,” 
June 24, 2015, http://www.burr.senate.gov/press/releases/senate-intelligence-committee-advances-fy2016-
authorization-bill?.  
84 U.S. House of Representative Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Press Release: House Intelligence 
Committee Passes Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Bill,” June 4, 2016, 
http://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=446.  
85 Tal Kopan, “Meet Donald Trump’s think tanks,” CNN, December 7, 2016, accessed on February 12, 2017, 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/06/politics/donald-trump-heritage-foundation-transition/index.html.  
86 Katie Glueck, “Trump’s shadow transition team,” Politico, November 22, 2016, accessed on February 12, 2017, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/trump-transition-heritage-foundation-231722.  
87 Mary Habeck and Charles D. Stimson, “Backgrounder – Reforming Intelligence: A Proposal for Reorganizing the 





report proposed a strengthened DNI with a greater role for the National Intelligence Officers to 
manage collection and analysis for their region or function across agencies,88 potentially 
reducing the independence of CIA’s analysis. Further, to encourage expertise-building, Heritage 
proposed that the community increase the hiring of PhD-holders and create a system of faster 
promotions for those who remain in the same subject area over those who are generalists and 
move into different substantive accounts.89 Heritage also recommended for the new 
administration to reduce federal employee compensation to better align it with the private 
sector. 9091 Heritage scholars Rachel Greszler and James Sherk assessed that federal employees 
were paid between 30 and 40 percent more than their private sector counterparts and 
recommended reductions in the GS pay scale, smaller annual pay increases, and phasing out of 
defined pension plans.92 These proposals based on federal employee surveys are likely to lead 
to greater attrition rates and hamper retention efforts. 
Policy Proposal 
This policy proposal focuses on the internal factors that lead to greater attrition rates and not 
the external ones or CIA’s recruiting program. It is out of the purview of DA senior leadership to 
comment on the external factors that affect attrition such as how the White House and 
Congress use (or not) its analytic products or make changes to federal benefits. Further, the DA 
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has yet to have an issue in attracting Americans to apply for employment at CIA. Whether the 
people applying possess the right mix of skills, education, languages, and experiences that the 
Directorate needs is beyond the scope of this Memo. This proposal outlines eight options to 
better train and develop first-line supervisors and provide them the tools to retain talent. The 
proposal is directed at first-line supervisors because study after study have demonstrated their 
central role in talent management. In 2009, 51 percent of respondents in a CIA survey said that 
poor management at the first-line supervisor level was the reason they were leaving or 
considering leaving the Agency.93 This result worsened four percentage points compared to a 
CIA survey conducted five years earlier.94  
 The eight options are split between four tiers of DA officers: Senior Leaders, Midlevel 
Managers, First-Line Supervisors, and Analysts (see Figure 1). The most important option is No. 
6 (see Figure 2 for a brief description of each option), creating a mandatory training program 
for first-line supervisors, and the other seven options either further develop this cadre of 
officers, provide them tools to help retain talent, or generate data that can be more effectively 
measured to gauge progress. The proposal’s goals are to observe an overall reduction in the 
DA’s attrition rate and partially mitigate the external challenges that are likely to cause a spike 
in attrition before 2020. Also, to observe a consistent increase over time in the DA’s Supervisory 
Effectiveness Index scores on the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey and match and 
eventually surpass the federal government’s gold standard in this category, NASA. Consistent 
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increases in these scores will demonstrate that a culture of leadership development and 
employee engagement is taking hold in the Directorate. 
 
Policy Authorization 
 The CIA, as discussed in the History section, enjoys broad latitude since its founding to 
ignore, accept, or modify civil service rules and regulations as codified in Title 5 of the U.S. 
Code.95 However, Congress maintains the power of the purse and though the CIA is authorized 
to approve certain benefits, the Agency must obtain the necessary money, manpower, and 
other resources as part of annual Intelligence authorization legislation to put these plans into 
action.  Options 2 and 8 are the only ones requiring House and Senate Intelligence Committee 
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Senior Leaders 
(Senior Intelligence Service) 
First-Line Supervisors 
(Senior GS-14s and GS-15s) 
Analysts 
(GS-7 to GS-14) 
Midlevel Managers 
(Senior GS-15s) 
Tier I – Data Collection, Resource 
  
Tier II – Mentorship 
Tier III – CAP for Supervisors (CAP-S) 
Tier IV – Continuing Service Agreements 
Figure 1: Directorate of Analysis (DA) Policy Roles 
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approval. For No. 2, SSCI and HPSCI would need to authorize GAO to conduct a well-defined, 
time-limited audit of the DA’s human capital management programs. It would be essential for 
these committees on jurisdictional grounds to agree to allow GAO’s auditing experts to assess 
an intelligence program that is typically outside of their purview, according to a retired senior 
DA officer.96 CIA also would need Congress to appropriate a budget and regulations to 
implement No. 8 on providing targeted retention bonuses. CIA can decide to release its survey 
data (No. 3), but fails to do so probably because of counterintelligence concerns. The Agency 
would need to confer and coordinate with the ODNI before publishing its data so that all 
seventeen IC agencies have an opportunity to review their own data publishing policies. 
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Figure 2: Policy Proposal Options 
Option Authorizing Tool Implementation Mechanism 
Tier I – Senior Leaders 
1. Implement OPM’s 
HRStat 
• Internal CIA decision • Work with OPM to 
customize HRStat 
protocols  
2. Request GAO audit of 
DA Talent 
Management 
• Annual Intelligence 
Authorization Act 
• Work with Congressional 
oversight committees to 
authorize GAO audit 
3. Greater Transparency 
on Best Places to 
Work Surveys 
• Internal CIA decision 
• Confer with ODNI 
• Work with ODNI and 
OPM to release CIA data 
4. Create “High-
Potentials” List 
• Internal CIA decision • DA Front Office creates 
and maintains a list of 
“high-potentials”  
Tier 2 – Midlevel Managers 
5. Expand Mentoring of 
First-Line Supervisors 
• Internal CIA decision • Assign each first-line 
supervisor a midlevel 
manager mentor  
Tier 3 – First-Line Supervisors: 
6. Mandatory 
attendance at Career 
Analyst Program for 
Supervisors (CAP-S) 
• Internal CIA decision • Sherman Kent School 
expands training to 
include analytic managers 
Tier 4 – Analysts 
7. Expand use of 
continuing service 
agreements (CSA) for 
rotations outside the 
Directorate 
• Internal CIA decision • Analysts must sign CSA 
for up to three years 
following rotational 
assignment 
8. Targeted Retention 
Bonuses  
• Annual Intelligence 
Authorization Act 
• Provide bonuses to retain 






 Half of the options fall on DA Senior Leaders to implement. The first three options seek 
to improve data collection, create an accurate assessment of where the DA is on talent 
management, and provide dynamic, measurable information to assess the effectiveness of a 
new program going forward. These options support the adage that “what can be measured, can 
be improved.” The first (No. 1) is working internally with CIA’s Talent Center and Directorate of 
Support to implement OPM’s HRStat protocol. HRStat is a data-driven approach to workforce 
planning that “identifies key human capital data for collection and analysis to understand 
trends and actions that can improve agency performance.”97 OPM launched a pilot program in 
fiscal year 2012 to help agencies leverage data to make better decisions.98 The second (No. 2) is 
to work with the Congressional intelligence committees and encourage them to authorize 
GAO’s experts to audit DA talent management. Since 2001, GAO has found the federal 
government’s human capital management programs as “high risk.” GAO would be able to 
provide tailored feedback, data trends, and recommendations annually for a time period of the 
DA’s choosing. The third (No. 3) is for the Agency to be more transparent in its survey results on 
the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey without providing data that releases classified 
information such as overall workforce numbers or a break down between analysis and 
operations personnel. Currently, the entire Intelligence Community—all seventeen agencies—
provide OPM a sanitized bulk response that is meaningless in helping an organization improve, 
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according to a Director of the Partnership for Public Service.99 The community is ranked 
number 3 among large Agencies as a best place to work, but this ranking does not account for 
variations in working at CIA versus State/INR, or Treasury versus NSA. The fourth (No. 4) is the 
creation of a “high-potentials” list of those promising officers who possess the talent to 
eventually ascend into the senior executive or senior analytic service ranks. CIA in the 1960s 
used to keep a “comers” list for the most promising GS-12 to 14 analysts that was consulted 
upon when discussing rotations, overseas assignments, and full-time academic training so that 
the future of the Agency was being provided with the training and experiences needed to 
thrive.100 
 The next option (No. 5) assigns a midlevel manager mentor to each first-line supervisor, 
preferably outside of their Mission Center. This will enable both officers to develop a broad 
network of managers across mission areas. The DA can direct an affinity group to create a 
program to match mentor-mentees pairs.  
 The sixth option (No. 6) is the most important and resource intensive and will require 
major commitment and support from the DA front office because it will cause a cultural shift 
akin to the creation of the mandatory Career Analyst Program (CAP) in the late 1990s. The 
proposed four-week CAP for Supervisors (CAP-S) preferably to occur prior to taking over a team 
should at minimum cover the change in role from expert analyst to supervisor, leading change, 
driving an analytic program, dealing with problem employees, and inspiring and developing 
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your employees.101 The focus should be tied to the Supervisory Index Scores and other 
recommendations from OPM and GAO to retain talent. The Sherman Kent School should create 
a team to develop a course and present their findings to the DA Front Office within 90 days. 
They should reach out to and learn from manager training programs at General Electric (GE), 
NASA, the US Army, and the non-profit Partnership for Public Service, who develops leadership 
programs for government agencies. The start-up travel costs would be approximately $12,000, 
based on U.S. General Services Administration per diem costs.102 A bare bones version of the 
course using three staffers and meeting in Agency-owned or leased conference rooms would 
not require additional funds, except for the cost of printing course materials. A course with 
contractor support—probably two former DA senior leaders—would cost $400,000 per year 
and a three-day offsite at Wye River or Airlie costs $300-400 per night for a total of $6,000 per 
course running (10 students, 3 instructors, and 2 guest lecturers).103104 
 The last two options (Nos. 7 and 8) directly target and affect the analysts. The first is a 
change in policy on rotations and overseas assignments. The Directorate sends analysts 
overseas, the White House, the State Department, Military commands, and other IC agencies to 
broaden their experiences and to bring those experiences back to the DA. Frequently, this 
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expertise is not returned to the Directorate. A simple policy change requiring analysts to sign a 
continuing service agreement before departure would ensure that the DA receives an 
immediate return on its investment and deters those who know they are leaving in a couple 
years from taking a developmental opportunity from analysts who intend to stay. The last 
option is providing targeted retention bonuses to the high-profile list from option No. 4 and 
others who the DA wants to retain. For this to work, the data collected through HRStat and 
GAO’s audit must be able to tell us when analysts are most likely to leave the DA and also the 
year in service after which they are most likely to stay. We already provide student loan 
repayment for the first six years of an analyst’s career requiring continuing service agreements 
of one year that begins following the last loan payment. If the data shows analysts depart 
between years 8 and 10, and if they stay past year 12 then they will serve for another decade, 
then the DA should flood this cohort with opportunities to entice them to remain. In 2004, 
Congress enacted the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004105 to aid that agency’s ability to attract and 
retain the best talent. NASA was authorized to provide retention bonuses up to 50 percent of 
basic pay to address critical needs and up to 25 percent of basic pay for non-critical ones. Also, 
the personnel receiving bonuses were required to sign continuing service agreements between 
a length of six months and four years.106 The cost to retain 100 GS-13, Step 5 analysts would be 
$3.2 million per year averaging out to a 30 percent bonus. 
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The proposal seeks to reduce the DA’s attrition rate and steadily increase employee 
engagement scores, which are a valuable signpost to foreshadow retention problems. Though 
the policy goals are laudable and necessary to maintain a world-class analytic cadre, the eight 
options presented possess benefits and limitations to their adoption and capacity to affect real 
and lasting change. This section will focus most of its analysis on Option 6 in creating a 
mandatory first-line supervisor course because of its central role in the overall proposal.  
Policy Benefits 
 Leadership training for first-line supervisors is an effective way to retain top employees 
and increase employee engagement, according to academic and survey research. In 2011, two 
academics from American University and one from Indiana University studied employee 
turnover in the federal government and found that supervisors are vital to retaining top 
talent.107 Their research revealed that academic studies consistently concluded that an 
“employee’s satisfaction with other employees and supervisor is negatively associated with 
turnover…and that communications with supervisors and employees alleviated intent to 
leave.”108 They further assessed that supervisors should seek to develop relationships with each 
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subordinate and understand their motivations in order to inspire and engage them in the unit’s 
mission.109 This skill does not come naturally to most first-time managers as they are typically 
selected based on their individual expertise and performance and not as much on an aptitude 
for leadership. Linda Hill in Harvard Business Review noted that businesses suffer when 
organizations fail to adequately prepare substantive experts for the transition to 
management.110 The performance-management consulting company Gallup in 2015 completed 
its latest survey of the American manager. Its review of four decades of research into 2.5 
million manager-led teams concurred with academic research on the significance of managers 
to employee engagement. Gallup found that managers account for 70 percent of the variance 
in employee engagement scores and that half of all employees had left their jobs because of a 
poor manager.111 
 Federal leadership training also has been shown to be effective in quickly improving 
employee engagement. The Department of Labor (DOL) since the first Best Places to Work in 
the Federal Government rankings were released in 2003 scored among the lowest in the 
survey.112 In 2012, the DOL’s then-Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management T. 
Michael Kerr worked with the Partnership for Public Service to create a customized mandatory 
leadership training course for its managers and supervisors.113 The training started with senior 
executives and worked down to eventually incorporate managers at every level. The 
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Partnership worked with over 2,000 DOL leaders with 96 percent of first-line supervisors 
recommending the training.114 Within three years, DOL rose its scores from one of the worst 
federal agencies to number 6 with individual scores increasing across the board on effective 
leadership, empowerment, and fairness.115 NASA also has leveraged the Best Places survey to 
gauge the effectiveness of its leadership programs. The agency increased its scores since 2003 
moving into the top 5 in the large agency category between 2007 and 2011 and being number 1 
since 2012, according to the Partnership for Public Service.116 NASA focuses intently on 
leadership development and has created courses for its first-time supervisors to transform 
them from “someone who manages others’ work to someone who engages employees and 
makes them feel excited to come to work.”117 In 2015, the agency released its human capital 
plan with “Building Model Supervisors and Leaders” as a critical component.118 Each NASA 
center is developing an 80 hour training course for new team leads and those interested in 
management to teach them self-awareness, organizational culture, and other modules to 
prepare them for their new roles.119 The plan also includes a claimed “non-comprehensive 
inventory” of 51 tools and strategies to help supervisors increase performance, ranging from 
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self-assessments, leadership courses for each grade level, specific skill building, human resource 
familiarity, and networking opportunities.120 
 Beyond leadership training’s effectiveness, the DA creating this leadership course would 
align it with organizations that are known for their leadership development, namely General 
Electric (GE) and the U.S. Army. GE is known for its commitment to leadership since it started 
leadership training courses in the 1950s and is consistently ranked as the best company to 
develop leaders.121 GE employees within six months of becoming a first-time supervisor must 
take the New Management Development Course at GE’s 59-acre campus in Crotonville, New 
York.122 GE teaches 16 levels of courses with most in-residence ones lasting between three and 
four weeks.123 GE’s senior leadership commitment to the importance of its training program is 
demonstrated by their involvement. For 25 years, CEO Jack Welch and his successor Jeffrey 
Immelt attended 329 of 330 executive-level courses with Welch missing the one because of 
heart bypass surgery.124 In 2005, the WMD Commission recommended that the Intelligence 
Community create training programs for new managers and noted specifically how “CIA 
managers receive a small portion of the training provided to their military counterparts.”125 DA 
leadership training pales in comparison to U.S. Army officers who attend weeks of training in 
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two phases of the Basic Officers Leadership Course.126 The Captains Career Course for newly 
minted O-3 officers is job-specialty specific (such as Infantry, Armor, Intelligence, etc.) and lasts 
for 20-21 weeks. A typical Captain will attend the course between 4 and 7 years of beginning his 
or her career in the military.127 It is important to highlight that a military O-3 is equivalent rank 
to a GS-11/12 federal employee. Also, DA officers only are eligible to become team chiefs at GS-
14 and typically possess over seven years of experience. Further, Army civilians by the time they 
have reached GS-15 have taken 9 weeks of leadership training at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 
focused on managing projects, directing resources, leading change, and inspiring a vision.128 
 A successful leadership course that meets attrition reduction targets would save the DA 
money over time. A background check for a security clearance costs between $3,000 and 
$15,000, according to OPM’s National Background Investigations Bureau and a financial 
commentary website.129130 CIA conducts its own background investigations, according to the 
ODNI, so conservatively estimating a more in-depth review would cost at least $20,000.131 Per 
the calculations in the previous section, six iterations of the course would train 60 managers 
annually and cost rounding up $500,000 per year. Continuing the calculation, each newly-
minted team chief would be responsible for at least 8 analysts on his or her team for a total of 
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480 analysts. If the training can keep attrition to 5 percent from its potential surge to 10 
percent as the DA experienced in 1984, then in the first year the program breaks even and will 
be more cost effective in future years.132 (Retaining those 5 percent of 480 analysts equals 24 
analysts. Multiply this lost talent by $20,000 for a clearance and it equals $480,000.) 
 The DA’s Sherman Kent School is technically and administratively able to develop and 
teach the course. Since 2000, the Kent School has trained every analyst who has joined the 
Agency and was able to ramp up classes following the rapid increase in hiring post-9/11. The 
instructors could include in the four-week course modules on unconscious bias and other 
training to ensure that the Directorate is an equitable and fair place to grow in your career. 
ODNI has released best practices from throughout the IC on how best to hire and retain 
minorities, women, and persons with disabilities.133   
 Options 1, 2, and 3 are straight forward data collection opportunities. If there are better 
and more efficient ways to collect dynamic, work force data that can be drilled down to the unit 
level to spot inefficiencies and head off problems early, then that avenue should be pursued. 
Also, publicizing disaggregated Best Places scores would force the DA and Agency to improve 
and not hide its problems behind security practices. As scores improve, this could be a 
recruiting benefit to replace the fading attraction of working for CIA following 9/11 and 
supporting the executive branch of the first African-American President. 
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 Options 4, 7, and 8 focus on identifying the DA’s high performers, developing them, and 
making sure that they know they are wanted and appreciated. Jack Welch when he was CEO of 
GE probed his senior managers with question after question so that they would learn the true 
talent of their people and not repeat pro forma job descriptions or other non-specifics during 
talent review sessions.134 This taught his leadership team to create a high-potentials list—like 
the DA used to compile in the 1960s—to ensure that the right developmental or stretch 
assignments were given to those who had the most potential to thrive at GE.135 The Army has 
successfully used continuing service agreements and retention bonuses to keep its most-
talented cadre of Captains from resigning their commissions. In 2007 and 2008, the Army 
awarded retention bonuses as part of its Critical Skills Retention Bonus program in amounts 
between $25,000 and $35,000 in exchange for three additional years of service. In these two 
years, the Army distributed $500 million in bonuses to over 10,000 officers in the 3 to 8 year 
mark in their careers because it assesses that a vast majority of those officers who stay in the 
Army beyond the ten-year mark would remain until retirement.136 
Policy Limitations 
 Leadership training will be effective if run well and not seen as a check-the-box exercise. 
Anything less than total and visible DA front office support will doom the course, according to 
former DA chief Fran Moore.137 In 2000, the DA front office committed to the new analyst basic 
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course (CAP) and made attendance mandatory for new analysts with very stringent waiver 
requirements.138 However, even with this support, anecdotally CAP’s reputation five to seven 
years into the experiment was poor, according to academic Joshua Rovner and recollections of 
author.139140 Former DA chief John Gannon said that the quality of the instructors will make or 
break leadership training for supervisors.141 If the commitment is lacking, then the Directorate 
will fail to demonstrate the value of teaching the course as a career-enhancing assignment to 
attract the best managers to teach the next generation. In the Army, some of the absolute best 
officers are assigned to teach at West Point including former CIA Director General David 
Petraeus and current National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster. Lastly, the 
four-week course length may have unknown adverse effects on attrition and the quality of the 
DA’s written product because of the influx of acting supervisors.142 In a full running of 60 new 
supervisors per year for one month, then a cumulative five years of acting supervisors will be 
thrust upon the Directorate every year. 
 In this politically-charged environment, publicizing the DA’s problems per option 3 is 
likely to lead to a reduction in resources, access to senior policymakers, and analytic credibility. 
Also, options 1 and 2 call for opening the DA’s processes to parts of the government that are 
not used to working in the unique environment of the intelligence world. Again, their audits of 
the DA may lack sophistication because of the lack of intelligence experience. Former DOL 
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senior officer Kerr thought it prudent not to invite in OPM or GAO because of the lack of CIA 
familiarity and instead recommended an audit from outside the executive branch, such as from 
the Partnership for Public Service or a group of cleared fellows from the Congressionally-
chartered, independent, nonpartisan, and nonprofit National Academy of Public 
Administration.143  
 The counterintelligence concerns surrounding greater transparency in survey results 
(Option 3) are real as evidenced by the Senate Intelligence committee inquiry into Russian 
intelligence activities in the United States.144 A disaggregated survey could give adversaries a 
playbook on what elicitation techniques to use if the survey results show that there are issues 
with management, pay, work-life balance, or diversity and inclusion. Further, much like a GAO 
or OPM audit, negative results could cause a reduction in support from the White House and 
Congress. 
  Options 7 and 8 on expanding the use of continuing service agreements and instituting 
retention bonuses have not been proven to work and could actually increase attrition. Analysts 
might feel slighted if forced to sign a contract for every developmental opportunity they 
receive. The perception then could spread that managers do not trust analysts to offer them 
opportunities without a formal agreement. On the retention side, it is very difficult to 
accurately target bonuses to the officers who were not already planning to stay. The Army’s 
bonus program probably failed because 77 percent of the Captains offered the money had 
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already indicated that they would stay.145 Further, the Army found that bonuses to the officer 
pool did not amount to enough to change someone’s mind about staying in the service and that 
non-monetary opportunities such as choice to attend graduate school or place of assignment 
had significantly more impact.146 Likewise, in the CIA IG report in 2009, pay and bonuses did not 
crack the top 10 for reasons why people left the Agency.147 
Political Analysis 
The primary option presented on creating a mandatory training program for first-time 
supervisors and the majority of the remaining seven options can be implemented without 
resources, endorsement, or approval from outside the Agency. Therefore, this section will focus 
on the political ramifications mostly of options 2, 3, and 8 because they require approval and 
appropriations from the DNI, White House, and Congress.  
The American public continues to view the CIA more favorably than negatively and 
almost certainly will not react or notice if the Directorate implemented any of the eight options 
in this memo. CIA’s ratings are down from 2011 when 88 percent of Americans gave the Agency 
“moderate or a great amount” of credit for finding and killing Usama bin Ladin, according to a 
Gallup survey.148 In late 2015, CIA owned a 57 percent approval rating, according to the Pew 
Research Center, and by early 2017, a plurality of Americans (who affiliate with one of the two 
main political parties) viewed the CIA positively, according to a NBC News/Wall Street Journal 
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poll.149150 In 2015, then-Director Brennan announced that the CIA would embark on a 
modernization program that would be the most significant and widespread restructuring of 
internal resources and mission focus since the Agency’s founding.151 Responses to CIA’s 
announcement of this decision on its Twitter feed that boasts nearly 2 million followers caused 
less than 100 people to retweet or reply to the message.152 In comparison, nearly 2,000 people 
retweeted and replied to CIA’s announcement to creating a publicly-accessible database of 
declassified information.153 The American public is highly unlikely to notice reforms within the 
DA. 
DCIA Pompeo and DNI Coats are likely to support the options, especially when 
presented as cost saving measures because the Directorate will spend less money and have a 
more-expert workforce if attrition stays low. Both former legislators are deficit hawks and 
supported reducing fraud, waste, and abuse within the federal budget to wipe out the deficit 
and eventually the national debt. DNI Coats will likely defer to the CIA on pursuing these 
options, including requesting resources to provide bonuses to those with critical skills. During 
his confirmation hearings and in prehearing materials, DNI Coats characterized himself as a 
head football coach who would make sure that all the pieces of the Intelligence Community are 
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working together towards the same goals, but that he would not micromanage individual 
agency’s operations.154 He further wrote that “the Intelligence Community must have the 
capability to project current and future mission-critical skill requirements and develop effective 
plans to close critical skill gaps…and must be innovative in its approach to attract future 
talent…,” indicating his probable support if the DA assessed these options were its best avenues 
to retain talent.155 
The White House is philosophically opposed to programs that would increase the 
retention of federal employees based on its budget blueprint for 2018. The blueprint pays for 
an increase in Defense spending of $54 billion and to start construction of a border wall for $2.6 
billion in reductions throughout the rest of the federal government.156 The White House in 
March 2017 publicized a copy of a Washington Post article that noted that the administration’s 
budget would “shake the federal government to its core” and seek a “historic contraction of the 
federal workforce.”157 The manpower and budget of the DA is classified and it is publicly 
unknown how the administration’s budget blueprint will affect the CIA. However, to convince 
the administration that the Directorate needs additional resources and billets to retain an 
                                                          
154 Daniel R. Coats, “The Honorable Daniel R. Coats, Nominee for the Position of Director of National Intelligence, 
Statement for the Record,” February 28, 2017, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-coats-022817.pdf.  
155 Coats, “SSCI Additional Prehearing Questions for Daniel Coats Upon his nomination to be Director of National 
Intelligence,” https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aphq-coats-022817.pdf. 
156 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, “America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again,” 
March 16, 2017, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf.  
157 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “For Immediate Release: ‘Damian Paletta, “Trump budget 





expert workforce should construct the argument around its support to the military and current 
terrorism operations around the world.   
The Senate and House intelligence committee members largely are the most supportive 
members of Congress to the CIA and are likely to be in favor of options that seek to retain 
talent. However, it will be a difficult sell to convince the committees to allow GAO to audit the 
Agency because the request could be seen as an affront to their unique role and sole oversight 
responsibility.158 To proceed with this bureaucratically perilous option, the DA with the DCIA 
and DNI’s approval should first discuss it as an outside-the-box option with the Senate 
committee. Both committees typically work in a bipartisan manner, but the different and 
distinctive ways each committee is carrying out its investigations into Russian interference of 
the U.S. presidential election suggest that going to the Senate first is less likely to cause a stir or 
backlash for the Agency.159 
Heritage Foundation’s probable opposition to the options is irrelevant because since the 
discussions will be taking place in a classified realm, it will not be able to affect the outcome. 
The think tank is a key actor because of its published analyses that are read and incorporated 
into the administration’s agenda. The argument for the White House that retaining the best 
employees is cost effective in the long run and maintains our analytic expertise to support the 
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Defense department and active military operations will overcome Heritage’s arguments to 
radically alter the IC and reduce the independence of CIA’s analysis. 160  
Recommendation 
I recommend that the Directorate partially accepts the options presented in this memorandum. 
Specifically, the DA should pursue Options 4, 5, and 6 on creating a “high-potentials” list, 
expanding volunteer resources for first-time supervisors, and establishing a mandatory Career 
Analyst Program for Supervisors (CAP-S) to retain our expert workforce. I recommend rejecting 
Options 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 on welcoming OPM and GAO oversight, requesting additional resources 
from the White House and the Congress, and expanding use of continuing service agreements 
because the political downsides and other limitations outweigh the benefits. 
 We are entering a period that looks very similar to one we faced in the 1980s that 
preceded a spike in attrition rates. I do not know what if any effect the loss of talent in the 
1980s and further manpower cuts in the 1990s had on perceived analytic intelligence failures, 
such as not foreseeing the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Indian nuclear test in 1998, 
and the attacks on 9/11.161 However, I would like the Directorate to retain the very best officers 
to confront tomorrow’s challenges and prevent (or at the very least reduce) strategic surprise. 
Doing nothing to try to avert this crisis, we risk turning into a hollow organization that is unable 
to compete with outside expertise and our policymakers will look to others to provide analysis 
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that probably will be less timely, less objective, and less accurate compared to the high 
standards set by our organization.  
 The Directorate first realizing that we have a problem and then implementing the 
recommended options seems bold for our conservative organization. However, as 
demonstrated by fellow federal agencies the Department of Labor and NASA, the U.S. Army, 
and Fortune 500 company GE, mandatory training for first-line supervisors is not bold, but 
necessary to being a successful enterprise. Further, academics, survey companies, 
Congressionally-mandated commissions, trade associations, think tanks, and internal CIA 
reports all recommend focusing on supervisor training as a necessary step in retaining top 
talent. The bold thing to do in the face of this evidence is to continue pursuing the same 
solutions to the problem.   
 The rejected options should be explored more in-depth when the political environment 
is more conducive for change. The political pitfalls of requesting additional resources or 
authorities has the potential to bring unwelcome attention and scrutiny that might lead to a 
reduction in core resources or mission of the Directorate. The risk of these options outweighs 
the potential benefits. Therefore, the Directorate should seek to improve within the confines of 
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